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REMARKS OF SETH P. WAXMAN AT THE
MEMORIAL OBSERVANCE FOR mSTICE BYRON R.
WHITE, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT,
WASHINGTON, D.C., NOVEMBER 18,2002
Seth P; Waxmad
Members of the Court, members of the family, and friends of Justice
WhiteAlone among today's speakers, I met Justice White only late in his life.
Growing up in the law, my relationship with him was the one many kids
today have with Michael Jordan- I wanted to be "like White" -like the
kind of man he was. I still have that aspiration.
Like Byron White, I served in the Department of Justice and was
l
altered forever by that honorable institution. And -like Justice White,
in my own lesser way, I strove within the walls of this institution to
protect the authority of the national government. Those themes of
Justice White's remarkable career-his tenure in the national Executive2
3
and his championing of the national Legislature - have been
marvelously captured in the remarks of my colleagues. It is perhaps
fitting then, in this of all places, to conclude by reflecting on Justice
White's perspective on the national judicial power-on the role of the
federal courts.

+ Mr. Waxman, a partner of the law firm Wilmer,. Cutler & Pickering, and Distinguished
Visitor from Practice at Georgetown University Law Center, served as Solicitor General
during the years 1997 through 2001. Mr. Waxman gratefully acknowledges the assistance
of Paul R.Q. Wolfson.
1. From 1961 to 1962, Byron White served as· deputy attorney general in the
Department of Justice under the Kennedy administration. William E. Nelson, Justice
Byron R. White: A Liberal of 1960, in THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 139, 140-41 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993) (detailing White's
position on the Kennedy team and his influence on the Department's role in civil rights);
see also Kenneth Jost, The Legacy of Justice Byron' White;. in AM. BAR ASS'N, THE
SUPREME COURT AND ITS JUSTICES 209, 213 (Jesse H .. Choper ed., 2001) (discussing
White's role and duties as deputy to Attorney General'Robert Kennedy).
2. Jost, supra note 1, at 213; Nelson, supra note' 1, at 140-4'1.
3. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF DEM(i)CRACY: LAW AS A PUBLIC
PROFESSION 202 (1999) (articulating White's acknowledgment that Congress should have
complete responsibility in responding to public administJlation problems); Jost, supra note
1, at 217-18 (noting White's career theme cif deference to Congress); Nelson, supra note 1,
at 154 (describing White's consistent efforts to uphold Congressional remedies for
inequality and injustice in society).
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Justice White is often spoken of as an apostle of judicial restraint.
That label is true, but incomplete. Justice White was certainly averse to
the courts engaging in what he thought of as second-guessing legislative
5
policy concerns. That aversion was at its apex when the claim was
grounded in substantive due process,6 the First Amendment,7 or the
s
separation of powers.

4. Jost, supra note], at 211 ("He believed in judicial restraint .... "); see also Jack
Wade Nowlin, The Constitution,11 Illegitimacy of Expansive Judicial Power: A Populist
Structur,11 Interpretive Analysis, 89 Ky. L.J. 387,462-63 (2000-2001) (listing Justice White
among the Justices of the 20th Century who advocated judicial minimalism).
5. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "the Court has no license to invalidate legislation which it thinks
merely arbitrary or unreasonable"). See also DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO
ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON F. WHITE 397 (1998)
(listing cases in which White advocated deferring to Congress' legislative judgment).
6. Justice White cautioned in his dissent in Moore v. City ofEast Clevelandthat:
Although the Court regularly proceeds on the assumption that the Due Process
Clause has more than a procedural dimension, we must always bear in mind that
the substantive content of the Clause is suggested neither by its language nor by
preconstitutional history; that content is nothing more than the accumulated
product of judicial interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments ....
. . . That the Court has ample precedent for the creation of new constitutional
rights should not lead it to repeat the process at will. The Judiciary, including
this Court, is the most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or even the design of the Constitution. Realizing that the present
construction of the Due Process Clause represents a major judicial gloss on its
terms, as well as on the anticipation of the Framers, and that much of the
underpinning for the broad, substantive application of the Clause disappeared in
the conflict between the Executive and the Judiciary in the] 930's and 1940's, the
Court should be extremely reluctant to breathe still further substantive content
into the Due Process Clause so as to strike down legislation ....
Moore, 431 U.S. at 543-44 (White, J., dissenting).
7. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689-90 (1972) (denying journalists a
testimonial privilege to withhold the identity of their sources); see also HENRY J.
ABRAHAM, "JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS": A POLITICAL HISTORY OF ApPOINTMENTS
TO THE SUPREME COURT 280 (3d ed. 1992) (contrasting White's First Amendment
jurisprudence with that of Justice Stewart); CARRINGTON, supra note 3, at 198-99
(summarizing some of Justice White's First Amendment decisions); Nelson, supra note 1,
at 151-52 (analyzing a distinction between Justice White's votes and opinions in freedomof-expression cases reSUlting from protests against racial discrimination and the Vietnam
War, based primarily on whether political authority structures were threatened by the
protests).
8. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 759-76 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court's interpretation of separation of powers in striking down the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967-1003 (1983) (White, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court should not have used Article I requirements to
invalidate all legislative vetoes; rather, the Court should use the more narrow separationof-powers doctrine as a ground for invalidating, if necessary, the veto on a case-by-case
basis).
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But Justice White did not shrink from extending constitutional
guarantees to new areas. He embraced the effort to give women real
Equal Protection;9 he fashioned a vigorous standard of rational-basis
review in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cente~ Inc.;IO he authored
Edwards v. Arizona,11 extending Miranda v. Arizona,12 from which he
had dissented;13 and he wrote the Court's opinion in Coker v. Georgia,14
striking down capital punishment for rape. IS
The pattern, then, is a nuanced one: judicial restraint, but only from
going "too far." Where Justice White thought federal guarantees were at
stake, he did not hesitate to act. 16 In his view, the courts were fully
17
empowered to remedy an injury to a federal right.
Consider one of his most remarkable decisions, Missouri v. Jenkins,ls
which held that a federal court had the authority to disregard a state-

9. See genemlly N.Y. State Club Ass'n Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988)
(upholding an amendment to New York City's Human Rights Law, which prohibited
discrimination against women and minorities in private clubs found to be public in
nature); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (finding that Missouri's
workers' compensation laws, denying a widower benefits on his wife's work-related death,
violated the woman's Equal Protection rights because the amount her spouse would
receive from her work-related death would be less than the benefits payable to the spouse
of a deceased male worker).
10. 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (refusing to recognize the mentally retarded as a quasisuspect class, Justice White maintained that they should nonetheless be protected from
invidious discrimination by requiring the State to demonstrate that the legislation
distinguishing between the mentally retarded and others is "rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose").
11. 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (prohibiting the use of the suspect's confession at trial
because it was obtained when police re-initiated contact with the suspect after he had
invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, but before counsel was provided).
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring that suspects be informed of their rights before
police initiate custodial interrogation).
13. Id at 526 (White, J., dissenting).
14. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that a sentence of death for the crime of rape
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
because it constituted grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment).
15. Id at 592.
16. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). In Duncan, Justice White
authored the Court's opinion holding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial
in a criminal case extended to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 149. The
Court recognized that trial by jury was a fundamental right in the American system of
criminal justice, and therefore the states were required to provide a jury trial to criminal
defendants. See id at 148-49.
17. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 240-71 (1971) (White, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the closure of public pools in the city of Jackson, Mississippi, in response to a
court desegregation ruling, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and that the judicial system should provide remedial action).
18. 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
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imposed ceiling on property taxes in order to fully fund a desegregation
19
decree. The lower court's order was assailed on the ground that federal
20
courts have no power to raise taxes. But Justice White saw the issue
differently. The only question, in his view, was whether a State could
disable itself from complying with the federal constitution by enacting a
budget cap and then pleading poverty.21 To Justice White, the answer
under the Supremacy Clause was clearly no, and a federal court was fully
empowered to provide that answer, and to order the State to comply.22
The sources on which Justice White relied in Jenkins are revealing.
First, he looked to the one-person, one-vote cases, which had invalidated
several state constitutional provisions providing for the apportionment of
state legislative bodies. 23 Second, he relied on the old "coupon cases" of
the 1880s, in which the federal courts had invalidated the States' efforts
to evade payment on their bonds. 24 To Justice White, the principles were
exactly the same: no matter how enshrined a rule was in state law, if the

19. Id. at 57. The Court found that the district court's action of directly imposing a
tax increase was an abuse of its equitable discretion. [d. at 37, 50. Nevertheless, the Court
reasoned that the district court could have required the Kansas City, Missouri School
District (KCMSD) to levy property taxes at the rate necessary to fund the desegregation
remedy and concurrently enjoin the operation of any state law that would have prevented
the district from taking such action. Id. at 51. The Court found that a local government,
which possesses taxing authority, may be ordered by a court to levy taxes in excess of any
limit established by state statute where there is reason stemming from the Constitution for
ignoring the statutory limitation. Id. at 57. See also Christopher W. Nelson, Comment,
Missouri v. Jenkins: Judicial Taxation and the Funding of School Desegregation, 26 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 529, 529-30 (1991) (discussing the significance of the Court's holding and its
implications on the equitable powers of the federal courts).
20. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 37.
21. See id. at 53-54 (noting the procedural history of the case and the inconsistent
positions taken by the State: first, attempting to avoid any allocation of the costs imposed
by the court, and second, arguing that the court should assign the costs to the State rather
than interfere with state law by allowing KCMSD to collect the money via increased
taxes).
22. Id. at 57. Justice White wrote:
Here, the KCMSD may be ordered to levy taxes despite the statutory limitations
on its authority in order to compel the discharge of an obligation imposed on
KCMSD by the Fourteenth Amendment. To hold otherwise would fail to take
account of the obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy Clause, to
fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes on them.
Id.
23. Id. at 55 (citing N.Y. City Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964)).
24. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 55-57, 56 n.20; see also Nelson, supra note 19, at 557-58
(detailing the Court's reliance on the "bond obligation" decisions).
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rule violated a federal guarantee, it had to be "disestablished" by the
25
federal courts.
Missouri v. Jenkins illustrates Justice White's belief that all three
branches of the national government should possess fully adequate
26
powers with which to accomplish their constitutionally delegated tasks.
27
For Justice White, as for earlier nationalists like Chief Justice Marsha1l
and Justice Story,28 the fundamental issue of constitutional law was the
task of constituting a national government competent to meet the
challenges of a changing society.29 Included within that governmental
power is the authority of the federal courts to get the job done.
Consider Jenkins in connection with three of Justice White's famous
31
dissents. 3o He is not known as a great dissenter -toward the end of his
32
career, he probably dissented less frequently than any other Justice.
25. See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 55 (rejecting the State's Tenth Amendment argument
and upholding the power of federal courts to "disestablish" local government laws that are
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment).
26. See id. (noting that the federal courts have the equitable power to establish and
enforce remedies necessary in meeting the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment);
see also Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 760 (1992) (summarizing the Court's decision in Jenkins as
allowing federal courts to use remedies that may contravene state laws, if necessary to
comply with the Constitution).
27. Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the "Great" Marshall Court Decisions?, 87
VA. L. REV. 1111, 1134, 1137, 1172 (2001) (characterizing Chief Justice Marshall and his
Court's opinions as nationalist); H. Jefferson Powell, Reimaging the Marshall Court, 87
MICH. L. REV. 1527, 1532 (1989) (analyzing the nature of the Marshall Court's
nationalism).
28. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why
State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813,
841 (1998) (describing Justice Joseph Story as "ultranationalist"); Klarman, supra note 27,
at 1172 (asserting that Justice Story's nationalist philosophy surpassed Chief Justice
Marshall's in intensity).
29. See Jost, supra note 1, at 211 (describing White's approach in utilizing the Court's
authority to support policies adopted by the other branches of the federal government);
see also Nelson, supra note 1, at 147 (articulating examples of White's nationalist views).
30. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 764 (1982) (White, J., dissenting); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 762 (1974) (White, J., dissenting); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,439 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
31. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 311 (5th ed. 2000) (showing a table of the comparison of dissent rates among
Justices, and listing the "great dissenters," notably omitting Justice White).
32. HUTCHINSON, supra note 5, at 355 (stating that "[d]uring his tenure on the
Supreme Court of the United States, White wrote 1,275 opinions-495 opinions of the
Court, 249 concurring opinions, and 572 dissents (354 from decisions on the merits or as to
jurisdiction, 218 from denials of certiorari)"). Perhaps in contrast to dissenting opinions
on the merits, Hutchinson describes Justice White's vigorous writing of dissents from
denials of certiorari, and points out that publication of such dissents in the U.S. Reports
dropped off dramatically after White's retirement from the Court in 1993. Id. at 400-01;
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But when they came, his dissents were powerful, and many of the most
powerful ones would have vindicated the authority of the federal courtS. 33
His first major dissent was in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.34
In that case, the Court concluded that federal courts may not adjudicate
35
whether a foreign government's "act of state" violates internationallaw.
To Justice White, this was an abdication of the authority of the federal
courts to do what they are supposed to do-determine and announce the
36
He readily acknowledged the President's foreign affairs
law.
authority;37 indeed, he would have deferred to a formal request by the
3R
State Department seeking non-adjudication. But his dissent shows that
he believed that when the issue was declaring and enforcing international
law, the federal courts are very much the equal of the other branches of
39
government.
Consider too Justice White's dissent in Milliken v. Bradley,4o in which
the Court held that federal courts have no authority to issue a multi41
district order to remedy segregation within a single school district. Had
Milliken gone the other way, the entire recent history of American
public education might well have been different.
In Justice White's view, the Court in Milliken "cripple[d] the ability of
the judiciary,,42 to remedy violations of constitutional rights by means of
what he saw as an arbitrary rule-a strict dictate that remedies in school

see also O'BRIEN, supra note 31, at 213-14 (tracking Justice White's publication of
dissents from denials of certiorari).
33. See e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377-79 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting). In Kroger, the Court reversed an Eighth Circuit holding that the
district court lacked power to hear the plaintiff's lawsuit because true diversity of
citizenship was absent. See id. at 377. Justice White disagreed with the majority, and
would have granted the district court the power to entertain the case because the nonfederal claim arose out of a "common nucleus of operative fact" with a federal claim. Id.
at 378-79 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725
(1966». White maintained that the plaintiff was only asserting a claim against someone
who was already a party to the suit, and therefore ancillary jurisdiction should be
recognized as providing power for the district court's review. Jd. at 382.
34. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
35. Jd at 427-28, 439 (holding that the act of state doctrine precludes federal courts
from examining foreign sovereigns' actions to determine whether a violation of
international law has occurred).
36. [d. at 439-41,450-51 (White, J., dissenting).
37. Id at 461 (recognizing the foreign affairs authority of the executive).
38. Jd at 462, 468.
39. See id at 467-68, 470.
40. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
41. [d. at 745, 752-53.
42. [d. at 762 (White, J., dissenting).
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43

cases must stop at the district line. As with Jenkins, the issue for Justice
White was whether a State could absolve itself of compliance with a
constitutional mandate through a maneuver executed through state
law-devolving authority for public education to local governments, with
44
district lines drawn by state law.
Consider finally Justice White's dissent in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,45 in
which the Court held that the President is immune from damages liability
46
for his official acts.
The majority opinion is grounded in policy
47
concerns to which Byron White, a friend of Presidents, was intuitively
48
sympathetic. But to him, Fitzgerald was a deviation from Marbury v.
49
Madison just as Sabbatino was-a retreat from the power and duty of
50
federal courts to announce, apply, and enforce the law. Particularly
alarming, Justice White found, was the Court's suggestion that the
Constitution itself might require absolute immunity.51 That was exactly

43. Jd. at 762-63 (White, J., dissenting).
44. See id. at 763 ("The result is that the State of Michigan, the entity at which the
Fourteenth Amendment is directed, has successfully insulated itself from its duty to
provide effective desegregation remedies by vesting sufficient power over its public
schools in its local school districts.").
45. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
46. Jd at 749 (concluding that the President (or former President in this case) is
covered by absolute immunity from liability for damages resulting from his official
actions).
47. Jd. at 751-53 (arguing that private lawsuits would divert the President's energies
from his duties and therefore pose risks to the effective functioning of the government, as
well as the existence of a strong public interest in the President's ability to take official
action without fearing vulnerability to civil damages).
48. Justice White was close friends with John F. Kennedy. ABRAHAM, supra note 7,
at 279. The two men met in London, while White was attending Oxford, both served as
PT boat officers in the Navy, and President Kennedy appointed White as deputy attorney
general, and later as Justice to the Supreme Court. Jd
49. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Justice White points out in Fitzgerald that the
Court ignored Marburys instruction that whether the legality of a head of a department's
action would be reviewable by a court would "depend on the nature of [the] act."
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 766 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 165). White
expressed concern with the Court's refusal to determine the immunity issue based on a
distinction among categories of Presidential action, as called for in Marbury. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. at 766.
50. See Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 797 (expressing dismay that the Court "casually"
tosses away its role of judicial review, and thereby the role of lower courts, in ensuring
protection of the law to all individuals).
51. ./d at 765 ("The Court intimates that its decision is grounded in the Constitution.
If that is the case, Congress cannot provide a remedy against Presidential misconduct and
the criminal laws of the United States are wholly inapplicable to the President. I find this
approach completely unacceptable."). See generally id at 770-83 (rejecting the majority's
twin justifications for absolute immunity: an "incidental power" of the President, and the
separation of powers doctrine).
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the kind of broad, crippling, assertedly constitutional rule to which
52
Justice White was most allergic.
Profoundly concerned with reinforcing the power of the national
government, Justice White was most careful to include the judicial
branch, as well as its political counterparts, within his protective
embrace. For those of us who honor him today in this building, that care
finds a signal place in the pantheon of his legacy.

52. See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,221-22 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court crafted a constitutional rule without any textual or historical support, White
lamented: "[a]s an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do
what it does today; but in my view its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise
of the power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this Court"); see also
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531-32 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). White cautioned:
Decisions like these cannot rest alone on syllogism, metaphysics or some illdefined notions of natural justice, although each will perhaps play its part. In
proceeding to such constructions as it now announces, the Court should also duly
consider all the factors and interests bearing upon the cases, at least insofar as
the relevant materials are available; and if the necessary considerations are not
treated in the record or obtainable from some other reliable source, the Court
should not proceed to formulate fundamental policies based on speculation
alone.
/d
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